Philosophical Hermeneutics

Introduction

Out of the developmental stages of hermeneutics, from its birth until now, we have so far introduced two significant ones, that is to say the unnamed hermeneutics and the modern hermeneutics (Shlyer Makher’s view).
Philosophical hermeneutics (relativist)
Introduced in the 20th century, hermeneutics sought to explain the nature of any sort of perception. Thinkers such as Heidger(1889-1976) and Hans Gadamar(1901) are regarded as the leading figures in this era. Due to its philosophical objective, this hermeneutics was referred to as the philosophical hermeneutics; and because of its struggle with objectivism, it was referred to as relativist hermeneutics.
We now point to Gadamer’s most important outlooks:
One: Ignoring the author’s intention
Contrary to romantic hermeneutics that puts emphasis on reconstructing the author’s mindset, Gadamer does not consider the duty of textual hermeneutics as perceiving the author’s mindset. Rather, he places emphasis on the interpreter’s confrontation with and perception of the text, regardless of the author’s perception and particular mindset. He says:’’ Generally speaking, the meaning of a text is beyond what the author initially had intended. The duty of perceiving a text, specifically, is related to the meaning of the text itself.’’
Gadamer does not want to seep into the author’s mindset and display the process resulting in the creation of the text. Text interpretation is not equal with the reconstruction of the author’s mindset: ’’ Surely, perception is not related to ‘perception in its historical sense’, that is to say reconstructing the way leading to the creation of the text.’’ Rather, the interpreter seeks to perceive the meaning of the text itself.
The aim of interpretation is not to reach the author’s intended meaning. Likewise, the duty of interpretation is not to reach the perception and interpretation the early addressees had had of the text. Neither the author nor the early addresses can delimit the semantic horizon of the text. The meaning of a text, as well as what is proven within it, should be investigated regardless of its root and author’s intention; that is the only way through which one can open new channels of communication towards the text, and gain the possibility of access to novel meanings. As long as independence of and freedom from the author and the early addresses are not met, the possibility of a new communication will be nullified.
In Gamader’s view, the author is one of the interpreters of the text, whose interpretation and perception of the text is of no priority over the other interpretations; and the other interpreters are not obligated to follow his/her interpretation. Therefore, the author’s intention could not be a determining factor in perceiving the text:
Hermeneutics should not forget that when an artist creates a work of art, they are not the specified interpreter of that work. An artist as an interpreter does not have the power and automatic authority over the individual who has merely received the work. To the extent that he or she is reflected in their own work, an artist is the reader of their own work. The meaning he gives to his work cannot be regarded as criterion. The sole criterion for interpretation is that of his work and creation; that is, what the work itself means.
2: production, instead of reproduction
Unlike romantic hermeneutics, which saw text perception and interpretation as ‘’reproduction’’ of the author’s mindset and intention, Gadamer considers them ‘’productive’’. This means that a novel meaning is produced in the process of text interpretation; but, in this semantic production, the interpreter’s mindset and presuppositions as well as the text itself are involved: ‘’ the meaning of a text transcends its author. The secret, that perception is simply not a reproduction but an ever-productive activity lies here’’.
Gadamer’s formerly discussed the effect of prejudgment on perception and the perception’s amenability of the history of tradition. He also put emphasis on the applied aspect of perception and as well, on the idea that the usage of the text’s meaning and its conformity to the present time and that of the interpreter’s hermeneutic status is a component of the perception process. The above-mentioned ideas of his indicate that one cannot limit interpretation and perception solely to reproduction and reconstruction of the interpreter’s intention. Rather, perception is of productive nature and both the interpreter’s mindset and the text’s semantic horizon involve in this semantic creation and production. The questions the interpreter puts to the text, which are the manifestation of the effect of tradition and his prejudgment’s interference in his perception, indicate the mechanism of his effectiveness and as well, explain the secret of the perception’s productive nature. ‘’ This is the reason demonstrating perception is always beyond the mere Re-creation of someone else’s (the author) mental meanings. Questioning paves the way for semantic possibilities”.
Text perception is of conversational nature of two people. The outcome of the conversation is concerns both interlocutors. Therefore, although the aim of interpretation is to attend and be open to the text, the interpreter, as an interlocutor in this conversation, plays a major role in forming the final product of this dialogue, which is the very meaning of the text and the content of interpretation. That is because perception occurs when the horizons join and the text’s semantic horizon is combines with that of the interpreter. That means a sort of agreement takes place between the interpreter and the text. Thus, they both collaborate in organizing the perception and interpretation:
‘’ Hermeneutic dialogue, like that of a real dialogue, finds a common language, which is not anything more than what happens in a real dialogue; and connotes preparing the means to reach perception. Of course, it is more in accordance with the real act of perception and reaching an agreement. The text utters something; however, this act of text will finally be what the interpreter reaches. They both make a contribution in the act’’.
Three, the semantic pluralism of the text
Traditionally, hermeneutics is in favor of the semantic unity of the text. After philosophical hermeneutics, it was believed that every text is of a unified and definite meaning which is the same as the author’s intended meaning; and hermeneutics, as an art or technique, is employed to reach that unified and ultimate objective. But, the philosophical hermeneutics stood against that traditional and prevalent impression and paved the way for the acceptance of pluralism, rejecting an idea claiming that the author’s intention equals the aim of the interpretation of the text.
Gadamer considered perception not as looking for something in the past, or the reconstruction and recreation of it, but the conformity of the text with the present time. Stressing on the interpreter’s dialogue with the text, he contended that the meaning of the text can be reached through question and answer; and also that the meaning of the text is the responses the text gives to the questions. Accordingly, he justified the text’s semantic pluralism. That is because according to this notion, the meaning of the text is nothing but its response to the interpreter’s question. And since the questions are various and pluralistic, various responses come up, all of which are the meaning of the text: ‘’to understand a question means to ask it. To understand a meaning means to perceive it, which is like responding to a question’’.
Striving to get liberated from our suppositions on the act of interpretation is not only impossible, but also obviously insensible. Interpretation exactly means to employ the presuppositions, so that through which the meaning of the text could really be made ready to have dialogue with us. Any interpretation should conform itself to the hermeneutic status to which it belongs’’.
The above words imply that the meaning of the text is more than what the author had intended to convey, and even more than what has been mentioned in the text. In the hermeneutic settings which are different from the novel questions, novel meanings could be presented for the text:
An individual wishing to perceive should pose questions beyond what has been said in the text. She should understand the text like a response to a question. If we see beyond what has been said, we will inevitably pose questions beyond what has been said. We understand the meaning of a text only by means of reaching the horizon of its question; a horizon, which in its natural limit and necessarily, involves the possibility of further responses. Therefore, the meaning of each sentence concerns the question the text is an answer to. But this necessitates the text’s meaning to be essentially more than what has been said in it.
Four, the interminability of the act of perception
From what has been mentioned, we can conclude that the act of text interpretation is an interminable one; and that is because of the possibility of unifying multiple horizons as well as endless conformations between the interpreter’s hermeneutic status and the text’s semantic horizon. If we agree that text perception is nothing but its responses to the interpreter’s questions; an on the other hand, if we also agree there are no limits on the interpreter’s side to exert his prejudgment and pose his questions; then, interminability of the act of perception appears to be normal. Thus, one can never assert to have reached the exhaustive and ultimate meaning of the text:
Every historian and philologist should take into account the fundamental uncertainty of the horizon of their perception. Historical tradition can be perceived solely as something which is invariably in the process of being defined by the course of events. By the same token, a philologist who deals with poetic and philosophical texts knows that they are inexhaustible.
Five, diverse perception instead of the superior one
Gadamer contends that we cannot judge among the innumerous interpretations of a single text and introduce one perception as the superior one. His fundamentals of hermeneutics necessitates so; because, ‘’perception’’ equals the interpreter’s conformity with the text as well as semantic unification with it. Therefore, there are no yardsticks based on which to decide on the primacy and superiority of one understanding over the others. For this reason, we can merely say we understand this text differently, and not necessarily better than others. It will suffice to say we understand differently; is we basically understand anything.
Philosophical hermeneutics is accused of ‘’relativism’’; because, Gadamer’s philosophical achievements as well as his analysis of hermeneutic perception and experience have no conformity with ‘’objectivism’’; and his report of perception and existential requirements to attain it are to explain and justify perception relativism. Reviewing his standpoint on text interpretation would be an evidence to support this claim.
The origin of this ‘’relativism’’ is the emphasis on the effectiveness of the interpreter’s semantic horizon as well as her hermeneutic status during the perception process. Gadamer believes perception occurs when the interpreter and the text agree; their semantic horizons are unified, and a common language is born out of the combination of the interpreter’s language with that of the text. Thus, they both contribute to the process of interpretation and perception. This kind of composition, mélange and agreement has an infinite potentiality of materialization. Therefore, the text is of no single meaning; rather, it undergoes a semantic pluralism, and the act of perception and interpretation is an interminable process. Furthermore, Gadamer reiterates that notions such as a ‘’better understanding’’ and a ‘’ more valid understanding’’ of a text should be discarded; and we can only claim a different understanding. Every interpreter understands their subject and experienced text differently, and cannot claim a ‘’better understanding’’ or a ‘’ more valid understanding’’.
Gadamer’s stress on the effectiveness of the interpreter’s semantic horizon upon the act of perception, which causes perception relativism, is because he considers ‘’application’’ as being a part of the perception process. Therefore, it is not the case that the interpreter would understand the text first and then adjust that perception and interpretation to his present setting; rather, he perceives the text in accordance with his present setting. And if something does not have the capacity of adjusting with the interpreter’s hermeneutic status, it will not be perceived by her. That means, it does not come into agreement with the interpreter’s semantic horizon; no unification and combination would occur between the two; and the event of perception would not take place.