Translator: Davood Salehan
Source: rasekhoon.net
Source: rasekhoon.net
Hegemonic peace brings instability to superior side as well. Such a peace that is created by those who are watching from outside impartially is in direction of the interests of the top side, and inside, oppositions against the government for any concessions and granting privileges to the weaker side is intensified, and as the level of non-mandatory privileges is higher, the domestic opposition level will be more intense.
The opposition within the hegemonic power use wartime discourse which emphasizes that any important point given is sign of weakness and shame of the government.
In fact, this was the hegemonic side that formed the Oslo Peace Process in Palestine; except when Israeli withdrawal from some urban areas in the West Bank created happiness for Palestinians, in most cases, the peace process has failed to deliver Palestinian national rights. Opposition was increased when the breakdown of the Palestine Liberation Organization in negotiations with Israel became clearer, and the Palestinian government was forced to apply various methods of repression.
Unrest in the fall of 2000 showed internal contradictions in Palestine and led to the polarization of Palestinian society and this will be continued in the future due to the hegemonic peace.
Due to created instability Israel is still engaged in hegemonic peace process.
Like Palestine, the pattern has been revealed in Israel since the Oslo peace agreement was signed in 1993. Most of the oppositions in in Israel consistently condemned Yitzhak Rabin, Shimon Peres and Ehud Barak due to the looting of Zionism. Even anti- negotiating government of Netanyahu also when signed agreements of the Hebron and Way Ryud (an agreement that was never implemented) was strongly criticized in Israel.
While Rabin's assassination in 1995 was the most obvious symbol of hegemonic instability of the peace, and then, public vilification towards the Labor leaders became common among Israeli calling them Nazis and murderers of Jews.
Twice after Oslo, rival of workers government lost power due to follow-up of "granting unguaranteed privileges" to the Palestinians by an overwhelming majority. Sharon's election victory over Barak in February 2001 deepened this situation. Hegemonic peace with Palestinians raised such a chaos in Israel so that the peace treaties of Egypt and Jordan had no effect any more.
Note the three peace agreements between Israel and the Arab countries: when Israel clearly had military superiority over Egypt, yet the 1979 peace agreement between them was agreement between the two strong governments that had shown they are able to create significant injuries to the other side. Although the peace in form of "cold war" led to testing the time, few people in Israel have questioned the benefits of it.
In another case, this conclusion about how was Israelis public reaction to the peace treaty with Jordan can be achieved: Israel had no avid force that can put pressure on the Israeli government to conclude a peace treaty; as there was no significant concessions that Israel was obliged to grant it.
Thus, it is only Palestinians that have made the peace horrible this much to the other side (Israel). In fact, years after the Oslo are the years mixed with terror, recrimination and bitter public debate about the future of Israel which has been associated to the extreme polarization of political factions in Israel.
Insiders and outsiders
On the other hand, hegemonic essence of the Oslo peace process had a significant impact on the power structure in Palestine. Contrary to what is imagined, the most distinct domestic political gap was between Palestinians since Oslo was not the gap between Hamas and the PLO, but it was the gap between insiders and outsiders.
Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza (insiders) refers to a population of 100 thousand Palestinians, while the outsiders are Palestinians who returned to the land after Oslo. It should be said that since the leaders of the Palestine Liberation Organization have returned from Tunisia, they have been addressed "Tunisians".
The remarkable feature of the Oslo treaty was it brought political outsider elite class, which had not lead a move or revolution since intifada 1987 to 1993 and were not even committed to it, to power.
Tunisians (outsiders) took the state apparatus of Palestinians in the hands and were mainly responsible for the preparation of a code of governance in Palestine. Any high official was determined by Arafat and key posts of power in the Palestinian government were in the hands of the Tunisians, although Arafat was preserved due to its history of criticism, but outsiders did not have this situation any longer.
The dominance of outsiders was mainly focused on the police and security structure. In fact, of the 15 agencies and police and security institutions in Palestine, except for two of them, all were under the command of officers loyal to Arafat.
In order to understand the dominating nature of the government of Palestine we need to examine the internal logic of consolidating power by the Palestinian government in the West Bank and Gaza Strip after Oslo. Oslo Agreement gave power to the exiled Palestinian elite class, which had many family and emotional circles with Palestinian population in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, but it had little political practical experience with them. Individual domination seeking was a tool that the Palestinian Authority, the organization of "Tunisians" applied in order to consolidate their power position in a society and opposition elites within it whom it had no confidence or control over.
The development of Palestinian civil society
Since the late 1970s, civil society of Palestine has been the most active and vibrant type in the Arab world. It is surprising that Palestinian civil society in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip owes much of its growth to unintended consequences of the Israeli decision.
First, after the 1967 war in which Israel occupied the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (along with the Golan Heights and parts of Sinai) from its neighbors, it opened its market to the occupied territories.
Hiring Palestinian labor force (mainly in agriculture and construction) allowed Israelis to benefit mass of cheap labor and economic growth. Thus, within a few years, 40 percent of the Palestinian labor force was employed in Israel.
The Gaza Strip became dependent to jobs beyond the Green Line in Israel in order to earn a living for his population, and the Israeli economy was also dependent to Palestinians work, who were forced to work by low-wage in Israel. The fastest and the most important consequence of this situation was the complete collapse of traditional networks based supporting customer which tied primarily urban Palestinian elites to rural communities and lower class who were refugees in Camp.
This situation also exposes Palestinian workers class to daily humiliation by the conqueror side, Israel, and accumulated a deep anger in the hearts and minds of the Palestinians, and the Palestinian villagers become aware Palestinians. The status provided the appropriate grounds for strengthening efforts of mobilizing the masses in the late 1970s with the emergence of a civil community.
The second Israeli policy, which had consequences for the development of Palestinian civil society, was the decision to grant permission to launch the Palestinian universities in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.
Bir Zeit University was the first university opened in 1972.it was a university like teacher training center. This trend continued by universities in Hebron, Nablus, Jerusalem and Gaza (Islamic University) 14 years later and then led to establishment of many education complexes. Until 1972 , only the children of the local elite could afford to pay for an education in the Arab world or abroad, but until the fall of 1987, nearly 20 thousand Palestinians entered Palestinian universities in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
Setting up Palestinian universities led to the emergence of a large number of local educated elite class apart from traditional owners of the Palestinian side. The new elite class was educated and less urban that launched principles of civil community in 1980s and by elegance, it could mobilize suffering Palestinians against Israeli military occupation, and the new elite class lunched the 1931-1987 Palestinians' uprising and intifada and brought it to the margin mainly by the PLO internal cadres.
Since then, Israel was forced to face educated young people from Palestine who were both native and activist.
The opposition within the hegemonic power use wartime discourse which emphasizes that any important point given is sign of weakness and shame of the government.
In fact, this was the hegemonic side that formed the Oslo Peace Process in Palestine; except when Israeli withdrawal from some urban areas in the West Bank created happiness for Palestinians, in most cases, the peace process has failed to deliver Palestinian national rights. Opposition was increased when the breakdown of the Palestine Liberation Organization in negotiations with Israel became clearer, and the Palestinian government was forced to apply various methods of repression.
Unrest in the fall of 2000 showed internal contradictions in Palestine and led to the polarization of Palestinian society and this will be continued in the future due to the hegemonic peace.
Due to created instability Israel is still engaged in hegemonic peace process.
Like Palestine, the pattern has been revealed in Israel since the Oslo peace agreement was signed in 1993. Most of the oppositions in in Israel consistently condemned Yitzhak Rabin, Shimon Peres and Ehud Barak due to the looting of Zionism. Even anti- negotiating government of Netanyahu also when signed agreements of the Hebron and Way Ryud (an agreement that was never implemented) was strongly criticized in Israel.
While Rabin's assassination in 1995 was the most obvious symbol of hegemonic instability of the peace, and then, public vilification towards the Labor leaders became common among Israeli calling them Nazis and murderers of Jews.
Twice after Oslo, rival of workers government lost power due to follow-up of "granting unguaranteed privileges" to the Palestinians by an overwhelming majority. Sharon's election victory over Barak in February 2001 deepened this situation. Hegemonic peace with Palestinians raised such a chaos in Israel so that the peace treaties of Egypt and Jordan had no effect any more.
Note the three peace agreements between Israel and the Arab countries: when Israel clearly had military superiority over Egypt, yet the 1979 peace agreement between them was agreement between the two strong governments that had shown they are able to create significant injuries to the other side. Although the peace in form of "cold war" led to testing the time, few people in Israel have questioned the benefits of it.
In another case, this conclusion about how was Israelis public reaction to the peace treaty with Jordan can be achieved: Israel had no avid force that can put pressure on the Israeli government to conclude a peace treaty; as there was no significant concessions that Israel was obliged to grant it.
Thus, it is only Palestinians that have made the peace horrible this much to the other side (Israel). In fact, years after the Oslo are the years mixed with terror, recrimination and bitter public debate about the future of Israel which has been associated to the extreme polarization of political factions in Israel.
Insiders and outsiders
On the other hand, hegemonic essence of the Oslo peace process had a significant impact on the power structure in Palestine. Contrary to what is imagined, the most distinct domestic political gap was between Palestinians since Oslo was not the gap between Hamas and the PLO, but it was the gap between insiders and outsiders.
Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza (insiders) refers to a population of 100 thousand Palestinians, while the outsiders are Palestinians who returned to the land after Oslo. It should be said that since the leaders of the Palestine Liberation Organization have returned from Tunisia, they have been addressed "Tunisians".
The remarkable feature of the Oslo treaty was it brought political outsider elite class, which had not lead a move or revolution since intifada 1987 to 1993 and were not even committed to it, to power.
Tunisians (outsiders) took the state apparatus of Palestinians in the hands and were mainly responsible for the preparation of a code of governance in Palestine. Any high official was determined by Arafat and key posts of power in the Palestinian government were in the hands of the Tunisians, although Arafat was preserved due to its history of criticism, but outsiders did not have this situation any longer.
The dominance of outsiders was mainly focused on the police and security structure. In fact, of the 15 agencies and police and security institutions in Palestine, except for two of them, all were under the command of officers loyal to Arafat.
In order to understand the dominating nature of the government of Palestine we need to examine the internal logic of consolidating power by the Palestinian government in the West Bank and Gaza Strip after Oslo. Oslo Agreement gave power to the exiled Palestinian elite class, which had many family and emotional circles with Palestinian population in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, but it had little political practical experience with them. Individual domination seeking was a tool that the Palestinian Authority, the organization of "Tunisians" applied in order to consolidate their power position in a society and opposition elites within it whom it had no confidence or control over.
The development of Palestinian civil society
Since the late 1970s, civil society of Palestine has been the most active and vibrant type in the Arab world. It is surprising that Palestinian civil society in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip owes much of its growth to unintended consequences of the Israeli decision.
First, after the 1967 war in which Israel occupied the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (along with the Golan Heights and parts of Sinai) from its neighbors, it opened its market to the occupied territories.
Hiring Palestinian labor force (mainly in agriculture and construction) allowed Israelis to benefit mass of cheap labor and economic growth. Thus, within a few years, 40 percent of the Palestinian labor force was employed in Israel.
The Gaza Strip became dependent to jobs beyond the Green Line in Israel in order to earn a living for his population, and the Israeli economy was also dependent to Palestinians work, who were forced to work by low-wage in Israel. The fastest and the most important consequence of this situation was the complete collapse of traditional networks based supporting customer which tied primarily urban Palestinian elites to rural communities and lower class who were refugees in Camp.
This situation also exposes Palestinian workers class to daily humiliation by the conqueror side, Israel, and accumulated a deep anger in the hearts and minds of the Palestinians, and the Palestinian villagers become aware Palestinians. The status provided the appropriate grounds for strengthening efforts of mobilizing the masses in the late 1970s with the emergence of a civil community.
The second Israeli policy, which had consequences for the development of Palestinian civil society, was the decision to grant permission to launch the Palestinian universities in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.
Bir Zeit University was the first university opened in 1972.it was a university like teacher training center. This trend continued by universities in Hebron, Nablus, Jerusalem and Gaza (Islamic University) 14 years later and then led to establishment of many education complexes. Until 1972 , only the children of the local elite could afford to pay for an education in the Arab world or abroad, but until the fall of 1987, nearly 20 thousand Palestinians entered Palestinian universities in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
Setting up Palestinian universities led to the emergence of a large number of local educated elite class apart from traditional owners of the Palestinian side. The new elite class was educated and less urban that launched principles of civil community in 1980s and by elegance, it could mobilize suffering Palestinians against Israeli military occupation, and the new elite class lunched the 1931-1987 Palestinians' uprising and intifada and brought it to the margin mainly by the PLO internal cadres.
Since then, Israel was forced to face educated young people from Palestine who were both native and activist.
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